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TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 
I JOHAN WESSEL ELFERINK, Attorney-General, ask the Northern Territory Law 
Reform Committee to investigate, examine and report on law reform in relation to 
the effect intoxication has on criminal liability. 
Matters for the Committee to Consider 
1. ls there a public policy benefit in holding persons criminally responsibility for 
their actions whilst intoxicated, irrespective of whether they acted voluntarily or 
intentionally? lf so, how is the best way to achieve this policy initiative?  
2. Should this apply only to certain offences, say, to driving offences and not to 
offences of violence? 
3. Will removing the admissibility of evidence of self-induced intoxication in 
relation to the commission of an offence achieve the purported public policy 
benefit, by limiting the use a tribunal of fact may make of such evidence?  
4. Should there be a distinction between offences of basic intent and specific 
intent for the purposes of the use of evidence of self-induced intoxication?  
5. lf admissibility of evidence of self-induced intoxication is to be limited, for which 
fault elements should this rule apply?  
6. Should the onus of proof of fault elements be reversed when self-induced 
intoxication is sought to be admitted so as to deny criminal responsibility? 
7. Should a specific offence of committing a dangerous or criminal act, similar to 
the provisions previously found in the now repealed section 154 of the Criminal 
Code be reintroduced into the Northern Territory?  
8. To what extent should evidence of self-induced intoxication be disregarded in 
relation to sexual offences? 
9. To what extent should evidence of self-induced intoxication be disregarded for 
the purposes of determining the partial defences of provocation and/or 
diminished responsibility? 
10. Are there other offences where evidence of self-induced intoxication should be 
inadmissible or disregarded by virtue of the charge? 
For the purposes of this report, intoxication is taken to mean the temporary action of 
a chemical substance (whether illicit or lawful) upon the physiological and mental 
sobriety of a person, resulting in a toxic, abnormal condition. 
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In formulating this report the Committee ought to consider the applicability of  
R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64 and DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443.  I request the 
committee present to me a completed report along with a draft bill prepared with the 
assistance of Parliamentary Counsel by 30 June 2013. 
 
The Attorney-General, the Hon John Eleferink subsequently requested that the 
report of the committee be completed by 31 December 2013. 
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CRIMINAL LAW – INTOXICATION 
 
PLUS CA CHANGE.... 
 
Dr Bill Wilson came to Australia after an early career in the British Army.  He joined 
the NT Police Force and rose to the rank of Assistant Police Commissioner.  On 
retiring he continued the academic interests he had already commenced at the  
NT University (now Charles Darwin University) and became a lecturer there in 
history and politics.  In 2001 he was awarded a PhD for his thesis “A Force Apart – a 
History of the NT Police Force 1870-1926”.  This is clearly the definitive history of the 
Police Force NT during those years. 
Competence in research, coupled with active service in the Police Force over  
27 years, must necessarily add special weight to any pronouncement of his on  
NT Police duties and activities from the commencement of the Force under  
Inspector Foelsche in 1870 and thereafter. 
In December 1999 Dr Wilson spoke at a conference convened by the Australian 
Institute of Criminology in Canberra.  His subject was “An Analysis of Drunkenness, 
Disorder and Drug Offences in the NT 1870-1926”.  In his opening paragraph he 
emphasised that “Ever since Europeans permanently settled the NT in 1870, 
drunkenness, social disorder and drug offences have all posed problems for law 
enforcement officers”.   
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PUBLIC POLICY 
 
The Reference asks whether there is a “public policy benefit in holding persons 
criminally responsible whilst intoxicated irrespective of whether they acted voluntarily 
or intentionally?” 
Any “public policy” must necessarily flow from and be consistent with the attitude of 
society towards drunkenness generally.  It fails without public support.   
But public support differs at various times and in various societies.  A policy of total 
prohibition of alcoholic drinks failed in the USA because ultimately public support 
failed, and the policy was repealed.  On the other hand, the same policy of 
prohibition has for many hundreds of years and still today succeeded in Muslim 
countries based on the prevailing religion accepted by the public.  
Numerous examples of public policy varying from total prohibition to, perhaps,  
over-tolerance can be found throughout the world both in ancient and modern times; 
but, save as to note this obvious fact, this Committee does not consider, nor is it 
equipped to present, a sociological study of these variations.  It accepts, for the 
purpose of this Reference, that there is a broad public policy in Australia on the 
question of intoxication, which can be simply put as: 
(a) Toleration and acceptance of moderate consumption of alcoholic beverages; 
(Note particularly the views set out in Appendix 1 herein) 
(b) Social condemnation of drunkenness per se, but, (now), no legal prohibition;1 
(c) Support of statute law applying sanctions against anti-social behaviour or  
anti-social actions arising out of intoxication.  
Accepting the above as public policy (and acknowledging that some minority groups 
would disagree), this Committee is asked to consider whether there is a “benefit” to 
be derived from certain specific legislation which might differ from that which 
presently prevails.  Again, this Committee notes that the expression “benefit” might 
ultimately encompass an extra-legal enquiry as to whether the legislation suggested 
would or could produce the social benefits desired.  Nevertheless, a survey of the 
present legislation and a consideration of how, if at all, that legislation should be 
varied, will necessarily involve views as to the benefits of such changes as might be 
proposed.  Such views drawn from the experience of members of this Committee, 
and the experience of lawyers and others involved in the field might, it is hoped, 
provide at least a rational legislative policy as an effective basis from which to build 
up further research if desired; such further non-legal research being outside the 
bounds of this Committee’s expertise. 
                                            
1 Drunkenness per se was once a statutory offence; but now repealed in all States and Territories.  
Pursuant to s.128of the Police Administration Act of the NT a member of the Police Force may take a 
person into custody if that person is intoxicated and certain other matters appear as set out in that 
section 
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THE CRIMINAL LAW AND INTOXICATION 
 
The earlier common law had no problem with intoxication as an element in any 
particular crime.  It was irrelevant save, possibly, to aggravate the seriousness of the 
offence.  The position is stated clearly enough in Beverley’s Case 4 Coke 125a 
1603. 
 “Lastly, though he who is drunk is, for the time, non compos mentis, yet his 
drunkenness does not extenuate his act, nor turn it to his avail; but it is a great 
offence in itself, and therefore aggravates his offence, and doth not derogate 
from the act which he did during that time”.2 
Nevertheless the alternative view, that drunkenness could be an excuse, was no 
doubt as prevalent then as it had been in earlier Chaucerian times when the Miller 
had succinctly pronounced: 
 “that I am dronke, I knowe wel by my soun; 
 And therefore if that I mys-speke or seye, 
 Wyte it the ale of Southwerk, I you praye”3  
Thus, centuries ago, the battle lines were drawn.  Drunkenness condemns; or 
drunkenness excuses.  The debate continues to this day. 
The court in Beverley’s case is making no distinction between the actus reus and the 
mens rea.  If the accused did the prohibited act and the question was whether he 
intended to do so, then a state of drunkenness was irrelevant to examining the 
intent.  Yet such an absolute approach may be considered by many, to be unrealistic  
since it is clear, from common observations that drunkenness may affect the mind of 
the accused in various ways, depending on the extent of the intoxication.  It may in 
fact enhance the element of intent if it appears that the accused deliberately took 
alcohol to “screw his courage to the sticking place”, and give him the determination 
to do what he intended to do4; or it may indicate a condition where drunkenness has 
affected his capacity to form the intent; or it may be no more than a condition where 
the drunkenness may be a fact but not ultimately a fact of any relevance to the 
alleged offence. 
The leading case, for many years was DPP v Beard (1920) AC 470, which grappled 
with the question of intent and intoxication, and made it clear that in some rare cases 
intoxication might lead on to apparent insanity, in which case the tests for insanity 
would become relevant.  Beard’s case has been modified or interpreted in various 
ways, both in case-law and statute.  For the purpose of this Reference it may be 
more useful to consider the two classic cases which embody developments after 
                                            
2 See also Holdsworth Vol VIII p.441 “The rule laid down in the 16th Century was short and clear – 
drunkenness was no excuse for crime, but rather an aggravation of the offence"  
3 Chaucer – Canterbury Tales “The Mylleres Tale” 
4 See the discussion on “Dutch Courage” in Bronitt and McSherry –“Principles of Criminal Law” 4.185.  
The quotation is from “Macbeth” Act 1 Scene 7. 
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Beard, and stand at either end of the question of drunkenness as a defence in 
criminal law; and demand a consideration as to which end is preferable or whether 
there may be a middle course. 
The cases of Majewski (1977) AC 443 and O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64, both 
acknowledge that drunkenness may be taken into account in considering whether, in 
an offence requiring a specific intent, (that is, an intent specifically required by 
common law or by the appropriate section of a statute), that intent has been proved.  
They differ as to whether it is necessary or appropriate to consider the question of 
intoxication upon an offence of “basic” intent.  Majewski – “No” O’Connor – “Yes”.   
In DPP v Morgan (1976) AC 182 at 216 Lord Simon says: 
 “By ‘crimes of basic intent’, I mean those crimes whose definition expresses 
(or more often implied) a mens rea which does not go beyond the actus reus.  
The actus reus generally consists of an act and some consequences.  The 
consequence may be very closely connected with the act, or more remotely 
connected with it; but with a crime of basic intent the mens rea does not 
extend beyond the act and its consequences, however remote, defined in the 
actus reus.” 
But common sense, or reasonably common experience,5  indicate that a state of 
intoxication may affect even the “basic” intent of the accused to do the particular act 
with which he or she is charged.  Should this not be considered in determining guilt? 
The reply is robustly given by Lord Elwyn-Jones L.C in Majewski: 
 “If a man of his own volition takes a substance which causes him to cast off a 
the restraints of reason, no wrong is done to him by holding him answerable 
criminally for any injury he may do in that condition.  His course of conduct in 
reducing himself by drugs or drink to that condition supplies the evidence of 
mens rea, of guilty mind certainly sufficient for crimes of basic intent”.   
(1977) AC at 474-5. 
The direct approach of Lord Elwyn-Jones was followed by Lord Kilbrandon, Lord 
Diplock and Lord Edmund-Davies.  Lord Edmund-Davies was equally positive:- 
 “The established law then, was and is now that self-induced intoxication, 
however gross, cannot excuse crimes of basic intent such as that giving rise 
to this appeal” (p.491). 
Other Law Lords acknowledged some illogicality in this approach but nevertheless 
affirmed it on the grounds of public policy. 
                                            
5 It is remotely possible that some members of this Committee may have encountered some of the 
milder effects of intoxication but, of course, many years before the attainment of their present dignified 
and responsible positions. 
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Thus Lord Russell of Killowen says:- 
 “A man who has no knowledge of what he does cannot, it is said be a guilty 
man, whatever may have deprived him of such knowledge.  There is at least 
superficially logic in that approach: but logic in criminal law must not be 
allowed to run away with common sense, particularly when the preservation 
of the Queens Peace is in question”. (p.498) 
Lord Salmon conceded the illogically, but he, too, justified it on the basis of public 
policy. 
 “Ás I understand it, the argument runs like this:  Intention whether special or basic 
(or whatever fancy name you choose to give it) is still intention.  If voluntary 
intoxication by drink or drugs can, as it admittedly can, negative the special or 
specific intention necessary for the commission of crimes such as murder and theft, 
how can you justify in strict logic the view that it cannot negative a basic intention, eg 
the intention to commit offences such as assault and unlawful wounding.  The 
answer is that in strict logic this view cannot be justified.  But this is the view that has 
been adopted by the common law of England which is founded on common sense 
and experience rather than strict logic” (p.482). 
Again (Lord Salmon) 
 “my Lords , I am satisfied that this rule accords with justice, ethics and 
common sense, and I would leave it alone even if it does not comply with 
strict logic.  It would, in my view, be disastrous to allow men who did what 
Lipman6 did to go free. It would shock the public, it would rightly bring the law 
into contempt and it would increase one of the really serious menaces facing 
society today.  This is too great a price to pay for bringing solace to those 
who believe that, come what may, strict logic should always prevail” (p.484).  
This reasoning led one commentator to conclude that the Majewski approach has 
become “unassailable”.  Alan Dashwood-1977- Criminal Law Review puts it thus: 
 “The House of Lords in Majewski has clearly confirmed the rule that, except 
in the case of offences of specific intent, the effects of self-induced 
intoxication upon the mind of the accused at material time, however extreme, 
(short of insanity) they may be do not constitute a defence to criminal 
liability.  Thus, however doubtful its provenance, the rule would now appear 
to be unassailable short of legislation” (p.532). 
If the word “unassailable” seemed uncomfortably close to “infallible”, it was not long 
before heresy raised its ugly head in the Southern Hemisphere.  In The Queen v 
O’Connor (1980) 146 C.L.R 64 the High Court (by majority) refused to follow the 
reasoning of their lordship in Majewski.  The head note to the case states it clearly:- 
 “At the trial of any criminal charge, evidence of intoxication self-induced by 
the voluntary taking of drink or drugs, is relevant and admissible in 
                                            
6 The reference is to R v Lipman (1970) 1 QB 152 
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determining whether the accused has the mental element the law has 
prescribed for the commission of the offence charged”.  
(Barwick C.J) “Thus, if evidence of intoxication is supposed to raise a doubt 
as to voluntariness or as to the presence of requisite intent, I can see no 
logical ground for determining its admissibility upon a distinction between a 
crime which specifies only the immediate result of the proscribed act or a 
crime which in addition requires a further result dependant on purpose” (p.85). 
In the court below, (1980) VR 635 the judges of the Victorian Court of Criminal 
Appeal had likewise differed from the view of their Lordships in Majewski and Starke 
J commented: 
 “In this state, in my own experience until Majewski’s case, intoxication has 
always been left to juries as relevant to the issues of both general and specific 
intent”. 
Starke J also commented: 
 “Over nearly 40 years experience in this State I have found juries very slow to 
accept a defence based on intoxication” (p.647). 
Barwick C.J referred to these remarks and added, 
 “I do not share the fear held by many in England that, if intoxication is 
accepted as a defence as far as a general intent is concerned, the floodgates 
will open and hordes of guilty men will descend on the community” (p.79). 
Stephen J said this: 
 “No doubt even principles of the common law as fundamental as the 
insistence of proof of mental element are subject to exceptions and criticism 
founded upon a lack of logic may readily enough be met by a principled 
exception.  But a suggested exception which operates by means of uncertain 
criteria, in a manner not always rational and which serves an end which I 
regard as doubtful of attainment is one which I view with suspicion. 
I regard the Majewski principle as suffering from just such effects” (p.101). 
Schloenhardt in “Queensland Criminal Law” 2nd Ed 2011 at p.555 comments: 
 “Queensland, Tasmania, WA and NSW have followed the English approach 
of “Beard and Majewski by dividing offences into those where evidence of 
intoxication may be relevant (specific intent offences) and those where it is 
irrelevant (general intent offences)”.   
NSW seems to have taken this to extremes by providing some 95 examples of 
specific offences and assuring us that the list is not yet closed – Crimes Act s. 428B.  
(See Appendix 2). 
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As to crimes of basic intent, opinion is divided into three camps: 
1. Intoxication is not relevant, it never was, and it never should be; and there is 
nothing illogical about this statement. 
2. It is admittedly illogical to dismiss intoxication for crimes of basic intent, but 
public policy demands that villains should not escape the consequences of their 
villainy by claiming that intoxication bereft them of the capacity to know what 
they were doing. 
3. Intoxication, if properly raised, must necessarily and logically be considered, as 
much when the crime is of basic intent, as when it is of specific intent. 
If it can be shown that by reason of, say, a blow to the head, or some other traumatic 
shock, or in a hypnotic trance, or sleepwalking, a person lacks the capacity of form 
the intent, he cannot be convicted of a crime of basic intent.  Obviously these are 
events over which a person has no control and for which he cannot be held 
criminally responsible.  The same cannot be said for intoxication. 
S. 43AF provides:  
	 Voluntariness 
(1) Conduct can only be a physical element if it is voluntary. 
(2) Conduct is only voluntary if it is a product of the will of the person whose 
conduct it is. 
Examples of conduct that is not voluntary: 
(1) A spasm, convulsion or other unwilled bodily movement. 
(2) An act performed during sleep or unconsciousness. 
(3) An act performed during impaired consciousness depriving the person 
of the will to act.  
(3) An omission to perform an act is only voluntary if the act omitted is an act 
the person can perform. 
(4) If the conduct constituting an offence consists only of a state of affairs, the 
state of affairs is only voluntary if it is one over which the person is capable 
of exercising control. 
(5) Evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered in determining 
whether conduct is voluntary. 
Clearly, therefore, the distinction is drawn between events over which a person has 
no control (subsection (2)) and self-induced intoxication which is a condition brought 
about by the direct will and conduct of the person (Subsection 5). 
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The distinction between basic intent and specific intent is emphasised in the remarks 
already quoted from Majewski and O’Connor and elsewhere.  Broadly (but one must 
be careful here) those distinctions are equivalent to the physical elements and the 
fault elements, which are now the preferred terms in Part II AA the NT Criminal 
Code.  See s.43AB(1), 43AC and 43ACA. 
Part IIAA of the Code commences under the heading: 
Part IIAA – Criminal responsibility for Schedule 1 offences and declared 
offences 
Then follows s.43AA, and it is important to set it out in full: 
43AA Application of Part 
(1) This Part applied only in relation to Schedule 1 offences, and declared 
offences, committed on or after the commencement of the Part. 
(2) The following provisions of Part I do not apply in relation to Schedule 1 
offences, or declared offences, committed on or after the commencement 
of this Part: 
(a) Section 1 (Definitions), definitions of act, duress, knowingly  and 
involuntary intoxication; 
(b) Section 2 (Commission of offence); 
(c) Section 3 (Division of offences); 
(d) Section 4 (Attempts to commit offences); 
(e) Section 7 (Intoxication); 
(f) Section 8 (Offences committed in prosecution of common purpose); 
(g) Section 9 (Mode of execution different from that counselled); 
(h) Section 12 (Abettors and accessories before the fact); 
(i) Section 15 (Application of criminal laws); 
(j) Section 16 (Offences counselled or procured in the Territory to be 
committed out of the Territory  
(3) The following provisions of this Code do not apply in relation to Schedule 1 
offences, or declared offences, committed on or after the commencement 
of this Part: 
(a) Part II (Criminal Responsibility); 
(b) Section 277 (Attempts to commit offences); 
(c) Section 278 (Punishment of attempts to commit offences); 
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(d) Section 280 (Attempts to procure commission of criminal offences); 
(e) Section 282 (Conspiracy to commit crimes). 
Note for section 43AA 
A term defined in this Part has the meaning given to it for the purposes of this Part 
and the Schedule 1 provisions.  For example, the meaning given to the term 
conduct in section 43AD(1) applies for the purposes of the partial defence of 
provocation to a charge of murder (a Schedule 1 offence) – see the signpost 
definition of the term in section 1.  
(Schedule 1 appears in Appendix 3). 
 “Declared offence” is defined in s1 as: 
 “declared offence means an offence against a law of the Territory that, under 
an Act is declared to be an offence to which Part IIAA applies.” 
All Schedule I offences come under Part IIAA.  Other offences can be “declared” and 
will then also come under Part IIAA. 
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THE TRANSITION FROM PART 11 TO PART 11AA 
Part 11AA clearly introduces a regime of criminal responsibility different from the 
provisions of Part II.  See s.43AA(3)(a). 
This Committee understands that ultimately it is intended to bring all offences under 
Part IIAA. 
For the reasons hereinafter set out, that would involve that the NT Code basically 
adopts the “Model Criminal Code” already adopted by the Commonwealth and the 
legislature of the ACT. 
Commonwealth Criminal Code s.8.  ACT Criminal Code s.31 
Meanwhile, however, offences other than Schedule 1 offences remain under Part II 
of the code, so that, at present two different regimes for criminal offences apply in 
the Territory.  This is plainly an undesirable state of affairs, and, we understand, 
recognised as such.  
Obviously uniformity can be achieved in only 2 ways: 
(a) By reverting to the original provisions of Part II for all offences; or 
(b) By proceeding onwards to declare all offences to be governed by Part IIAA. 
We understand that the second option is the one favoured by the legislature and is 
strongly supported by the members of this Committee. 
Indeed, it would seem strange now to step backwards after the research and debate 
which led to the adoption of Part IIAA. 4. Or, to echo Macbeth, “returning were as 
tedious as go o’er.”  (Act 3, Sc.4). 
The Legislative intention is summarised by Fairall and Oliver in the paper.  “Finding 
Fault – Reform of the NT Criminal Code” delivered to the 10th Biennial Conference of 
the Criminal Lawyers Association of the Northern Territory at Bali in July 2005. 
 The purpose of the Criminal Code Amendment (Criminal Responsibility 
Reform) Bill 2005 (“the Bill”) was to insert a new criminal responsibility Part 
(Part II AA) into the NT Criminal Code to substantially enact the criminal 
responsibility provisions set by the Commonwealth Criminal Code and to 
apply those provisions immediately to offences created by or amended by the 
Bill. 
 Proposed Part II AA for the NT Criminal Code is based on Chapter 2 of the 
Commonwealth Criminal Code.  The Bill represented the first stage of a 
reform that would eventually see the present criminal responsibility provisions 
(Part II – Criminal Responsibility) repealed and new criminal responsibility 
provisions then have application to all offences.  The reform process is 
envisaged to take some years, as it will necessitate a review of the offences in 
each individual part of the Code and the re-drafting of these in accordance 
with the Model Code style and requirements for specification of fault 
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elements.  The reform process will provide an opportunity for consideration of 
existing offense and the fault levels applicable to them”. 
Until all indictable offences come under Part II AA, it becomes an important first step 
in considering any offence under the NT Criminal Code to ascertain whether it is 
governed by Part II or Part II AA.  “Criminal Laws Northern Territory” by  
Gray & Blokland (pps 98-99): 
 “It is important at the outset to ascertain whether a particular offence is 
governed by the original Part II of the Criminal Code, or by Part II AA.  This 
requires, first, checking to see whether the offence is listed in Schedule 1.  
Secondly, it requires checking in the legislation creating the offence to see 
whether the offence is a “declared” offence to which the provisions of  
Part II AA apply”. 
One important difference between these two legislative regimes is that s.31 of the 
Code still applies to offences under Part II, but does not apply to those under  
Part II AA. 
S.31 is headed “Unwilled Act etc and accident”.  Sub-section 1 then reads: 
 “(1)  A person is excused from criminal responsibility for an act, omission or 
event unless it was intended or foreseen by him as a possible consequence of 
his conduct”. 
This is a uniquely NT provision which, according to Fairall & Oliver has attracted “no 
shortage of unfavourable comment”.  The learned authors put the criticism this way: 
 “Under s.31(1) intention and foresight are necessary preconditions for criminal 
responsibility; reckless indifference or wilful ignorance will not sustain a 
conviction unless at least the “act, omission or event” constituting the crime 
was foreseen as a possible consequence of the accused’s conduct.  This rule 
sets a higher standard for criminal responsibility than either the law or the 
other Code states, both of which recognise negligence as a sufficient basis for 
criminal responsibility, even for serious crimes such as homicide”. 
The difference between the two approaches may be illustrated by the case of  
Kidd v Malogorski a Magistrate’s decision which went, on appeal, to the Chief Justice 
of the NT Supreme Court; being then referred back to the Magistrate on the basis 
that the Magistrate had not sufficiently disclosed his reasoning process.  The 
Magistrate then set out his reasons in considerable detail. 
The evidence was that the accused had taken “two little tabs of acid” and then 
smoked marijuana.  He became aggressive at times, calmed down and then became 
aggressive again.  According to witnesses he was “freaking out”, and on one of 
these occasions he quite seriously assaulted a woman by punching her in the face 
and throwing her to the ground.  The defence was, in effect, that owing to the drugs 
he had taken, he was in a state where he could not have formed the intention to do 
what he did and what he did was not foreseen by him.   
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The Magistrate gave a very detailed judgement in which he carefully examined the 
evidence of a number of witnesses. 
His conclusion was that “on the whole of the evidence I am unable to be satisfied 
beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was not at the material time suffering 
from hallucinations – that is false sensory perceptions in the absence of any external 
stimulus (visual hallucinations).  Nor am I able to be satisfied beyond reasonable 
doubt that the defendant knew at the material time that JM (the victim) was in the 
path of his bodily movements which resulted in the application of force to her”.......... 
 “On the whole of the evidence, including the evidential presumption created by 
s.7(1)(b) of the Code, I am unable to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that 
when the defendant performed the various bodily actions and movements ascribed 
to him, he foresaw as a possible consequence of his conduct the application of force 
to JM as an identified person”. 
The Magistrate therefore dismissed the charges. 
The point about this was that the charges of assault and related charges, not being 
Schedule 1 or declared, remained under Part II of the Code.  Hence His Honour was 
applying s.31 and, upon the very positive findings he made, the finding of “not guilty” 
necessarily followed. 
The decision caused much public concern because many saw it as an unjustified 
attack upon an innocent person by a perpetrator who had been acquitted because of 
circumstances caused by his personal decision to act illegally by taking drugs.  It is 
evidence of at least a strong view in many members of the public that intoxication 
should be no excuse for a criminal act.  In a similar case, the defendant had punched 
two women in the face, but had been acquitted because the Magistrate considered 
that “the degree of intoxication is so overwhelming to the extent that the defendant, 
in my view, did not know what he was doing and did not form any intent as to know 
what he was doing”.  A Committee of the Legislative Assembly for the ACT noted 
that “the Magistrate’s decision attracted widespread community outrage, both in the 
ACT and nationally” prompting calls for legislative reform to prevent a defendant 
being able to rely on the “defence” of excessive intoxication to avoid criminal 
responsibility.   
Fairall and Oliver have commented that s.31 “is fairly biased on subjectivist no7tions 
of fault in the sense that guilt is predicated upon a conscious awareness of the 
possible outcomes of particular behaviour.  The guilt of a person is determined by 
the state of his mental awareness”. 
Would the decision have been different under the more objective approach of  
Part II AA?  There may be considerable debate about this in view of a very detailed 
judgement; but at least the comment could be made that, insofar as the judgement 
considered the defendant’s conduct could have been involuntary, s.43AF(5) provides 
that “Evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered in determining 
whether conduct is voluntary”. 
                                            
7 The details are taken from a paper by Andrew Hemming in the  University of Tasmania Law Review 
– Vol 29 No. 1 2010 p 13 
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Part IIAA of the NT Criminal Code 
The “Explanatory Statement” introducing the “Criminal Code Amendment (Criminal 
Responsibility Reform) (No.2) Bill 2005” to the NT Legislative Assembly commences 
with the following paragraphs: 
General Outline 
The Criminal Code Amendment (Criminal Responsibility Reform) Bill (No.2) 2005 
(“the Bill”) is the first stage in the progressive reform of the Northern Territory’s 
Criminal Code.  The Bill sets out, with some minor modifications, the general 
principles of criminal responsibility in Chapter of the Model Criminal Code (the Model 
Code”) developed by the national Model Criminal Code Officers Committee 
(“MCCOC”), established by the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General (SCAG”) 
and as modified by SCAG.  This Chapter has been enacted both by the 
Commonwealth and by the Australian Capital Territory.  The Bill comprises Part IIAA 
based on Chapter 2 and also proposes new offences based on the Model Code to 
replace offences that are to be repealed by this Bill. 
Part IIAA of the Bill sets out the general principles of criminal responsibility, which 
will eventually apply to all Northern Territory offences.  The principles will not apply 
to all offences immediately.  There will be staged approach because a large number 
of amendments will be required in relation to existing criminal offences because 
existing offences are drafted on the basis of different principles.  The staged 
approach should also assist practitioners and courts to adjust to the changed 
approach and minimise confusion.  The criminal responsibility principles will first 
apply to offences contained in this Bill and thereafter to offences that are added to 
Schedule 1 or offences declared to be ones to which Part IIAA applies.  The existing 
criminal responsibility provisions of Part II will cease to apply to Schedule 1 offences 
or declared offences.  Some of the provisions of the existing Part 1 will no longer 
apply to Schedule 1 or declared offences because these matters are now provided 
for in Part 11AA.” 
The “Explanatory Statement” notes that the Commonwealth had already enacted 
Chapter 2 of Model Criminal Code, as had the Australian Capital Territory. 
In the article previously mentioned, headed “Finding Fault - Reform of the NT 
Criminal Code” delivered to the 10th Biennial Conference of the Criminal Lawyers 
Association of the Northern Territory at Bali in July 2005, Professor Paul Farrell of 
Adelaide University and Sue Oliver, then of the Department of Justice of the NT, now 
a NT Magistrate, carefully examined in detail the effect Part IIAA would have on the 
NT Criminal Code if enacted.  They commented that “it will mark the end of a 
distinctive and, we think, problematical fault standard, and the adoption of a different 
and, we believe, fairer standard adopted from federal law already in force in the 
Territory”. 
The learned authors concluded their paper with the following sentence: 
 “The general principles of criminal responsibility set by the Commonwealth 
Criminal Code provides the opportunity to address what we consider to be 
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fundamental flaws in the NT Code in relation to serious personal harm 
offences”. 
Part IIAA has now become Part IIAA of the NT Criminal Code. 
It is not proposed to discuss in detail the matters already examined by  
Professor Fairall and Sue Oliver since this Committee assumes that because of the 
arguments and recommendations there put forward, and with the guidance of the 
Clause Notes in the “Explanatory Statement”, the Parliament of the Northern 
Territory accepted those recommendations, as appropriate.  Obviously also, 
parliament has adopted the general principle that the NT Criminal Code should 
ultimately be basically in line with the Commonwealth legislation. 
The significance for this Committee is that the NT Parliament indicates that the 
expression “public policy” or “public policy benefit” should be construed primarily 
within such guidelines as can be ascertained by the Commonwealth legislation, 
although this Committee accepts that it is free to suggest other approaches if 
appropriate.  
Intoxication and the Criminal Code of the Northern Territory 
So far as Part IIAA of the NT Criminal Code is concerned with the question of 
intoxication, it appears to steer a middle course between Majewski (voluntary 
intoxication no defence to an act of basic intent, but can be raised regarding an act 
of specific intent); and O’Connor (intoxication can be raised as affecting either an act 
of basic intent or of specific interest).   
S.7 of the Code provides: 
(1) In all cases where intoxication may be regarded for the purposes of 
determining whether a person is guilty or not guilty of an offence: 
 (a) it shall be presumed that, until the contrary is proved, the intoxication 
was voluntary; and 
 (b) unless the intoxication was involuntary, it shall be presumed 
evidentially that the accused person foresaw the natural and probable 
consequences of his conduct. 
But, by s.43AA(2)(e) this section does not now apply to Part IIAA which now contains 
its own code in relation to intoxication. 
S.43AB divides offences into “physical elements” and “fault elements”.  Broadly 
(though one must be careful here) this division mirrors the previous division between 
“basic” and “specific” intent. 
S.43AR is similar to the original s.7 but in greater detail as to the circumstances of 
intoxication.  
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43AR Self-induced intoxication		
(1) Intoxication is self-induced unless it came about: 
(a) Involuntarily; or 
(b) As a result of fraud, sudden or extraordinary emergency, accident, 
reasonable mistake, duress or force; or 
(c) From the use of a drug for which a prescription is required and that was 
used in accordance with the directions of the medical practitioner or dentist 
who prescribed it; or 
(d) From the use of a drug for which no prescription is required and that was 
used for a purpose, and in accordance with the dosage level, 
recommended by the manufacturer. 
(2) However, intoxication is self-induced if a person using a drug as referred to in 
subsection (1)(c) or (d) knew, or had reason to believe, when the person took 
the drug that the drug would significantly impair the person’s judgement or 
control. 
S.43 AS then becomes the operative section, containing the circumstances in which 
intoxication may or may not be considered as a defence. 
43AS Intoxication – offences involving basic intent 
(1) Evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered in determining 
whether a fault element of basic intent existed. 
Note for subsection (1) 
A fault element of intention in relation to a result or circumstance is not a fault element of 
basic intent. 
(2) This section does not prevent evidence of self-induced intoxication being 
taken into consideration in determining whether conduct was accidental. 
(3) This section does not prevent evidence of self-induced intoxication being 
taken into consideration in determining whether a person had a mistaken 
belief about facts if the person had considered whether or not the facts 
existed. 
(4) A person may be regarded as having considered whether or not facts existed 
if: 
(a)  He or she had considered, on a previous occasion, whether those facts 
existed in circumstances surrounding that occasion; and 
(b) He or she honestly and reasonably believed that the circumstances 
surrounding the present occasion were the same, or substantially the 
same, as those surrounding the previous occasion.” 
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This section is almost precisely similar to s.8.2 of the Model Criminal Code save that 
2.8.2(2) provides that, “A fault element of basic intent is a fault element intention for 
a physical element that consists only of conduct”. 
(Presumably those drafting s.43AS of the NT Code felt that the subsection was 
superfluous in the light of the note to s.43AS(1) & (2)). 
S.43AS is not without its difficulties although the intent is plain enough that, 
generally, intoxication per se is to be no defence to any charge involving a “physical 
element,”, or basic intent, save for two exceptions.  The two exceptions are then 
given as “accident” or “mistaken belief”.  If either of these circumstances are raised 
evidentially the onus would then be on the prosecution to negate them.  Otherwise, 
the general principles of criminal responsibility applies to “fault elements”, ie specific 
intent, but the fault elements identified are “the only fault elements of the offence”.  
S.43ACA(3). 
On the question of negligence while in a state of intoxication, s. 43 AT is clear and 
rational. 
S. 43 AT 
 “(1) If negligence is a fault element for a particular physical element of an 
offence, in determining whether that fault element existed in relation to a 
person who is intoxicated, regard must be had to the standard of a reasonable 
person who is not intoxicated.” 
  Simply put, this means that as negligence is breach of a duty of care, an 
intoxicated person owes the same standard of care to others as does a  
non-intoxicated person; ie negligence is negligence.   
EXTENSION OF PART II AA 
At a recent Conference (21 May 2013), convened by the Attorney-General and 
comprising members of the Department and members of the legal profession, the 
question was debated whether the Code should revert to its original form, ie prior to 
the introduction of Part II AA, or proceed from Part II AA to further amendment in line 
with the Model Criminal Code as enacted in the Commonwealth Criminal Code.  It 
was resolved that the latter alternative was to be preferred. 
This was not surprising because the amendments had already been adopted by 
parliament after careful consideration and it would have been somewhat of an  
anti-climax to back-pedal.  Furthermore, the introduction of Part II AA led onwards 
towards uniformity of the criminal law in the Commonwealth, the ACT, and the NT; 
with the hope that the other “Code” States of Queensland, Western Australia and 
Tasmania would sufficiently amend their codes to bring them into line with the Model 
Code, and thus achieve practical uniformity throughout these jurisdictions.  The best 
argument for the Model Code is the immense discussion and research over many 
years of those drafting the Model Code, under the original chairmanship of  
Sir Harry Gibbs, former Chief Justice of the High Court; and after various meetings of 
committees of Attorneys-General and their legal advisers. 
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Realistically it must be accepted that the Model Code will not agree in every 
particular with all other Codes.  Inevitably some variation due to local circumstances 
or preference will remain.  But these should be limited and not opposed to the 
general thrust of the legislation. 
Realistically, it must also be conceded that the states of NSW, Victoria and  
South Australia are firmly devoted to the common law rather than codification; and 
here is no chance that they will change their position.  The possibility of a  
Criminal Code accepted throughout Australia is remote.  It is fruitless to argue which 
system is better since neither are pure examples of the induction or deduction they 
purport to represent.  An element of the common law can be “codified” by statute and 
the provisions of a Criminal Code are frequently clarified by case law.  Furthermore, 
the High Court, as the final court of appeal in both jurisdictions, encourages a 
common or close acceptance of a particular interpretation of similar concepts.  
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“PUBLIC POLICY BENEFIT” 
It is in the light of the above discussion that this Committee turns to the question of 
“public policy benefit” as referred to in Question 1 of the Terms of Reference.  
Clearly enough this Committee is not set up to conduct Gallup polls as to public 
opinion.  On the question of intoxication, we consider that the public policy is what 
we have already set out, that is toleration unless the behaviour becomes anti-social 
or threatening to the ordinary citizen.  We accept also that public policy towards 
criminal law as represented by Parliament has decreed that the administration of 
criminal law in the Territory should be by way of Code; and that Code should move 
towards uniformity under the Model Code.   
Coupled with this, however, it should be recognised that (as shown, for instance, by 
public reaction to the Malogorski decision), many members of the public consider 
that a person who voluntarily commits an anti-social or criminal act by taking alcohol 
or drugs to a point which affects his behaviour, should not be entitled to use that 
wrongful act as an excuse or defence for a further wrongful act.  Nor could that be 
suggested as, in any way, an unreasonable reaction and, as has already been noted 
is a position supported by some judges. 
To some extent this concern is now answered by the terms of s.43AS confining the 
exceptions to basic intent or “physical elements” in self-induced intoxication to 
accidental conduct or mistaken belief.   
This is the basis of certain judgements in Majewski already referred to, but 
encapsulated in the remark of Lord Salmon which are repeated here for ease of 
reference. 
 “my Lords, I am satisfied that this rule accords with justice, ethics and 
common sense, and I would leave it alone even if it does not comply with 
strict logic.  It would, in my view, be disastrous to allow men who did what 
Lipman did to go free.  It would shock the public, it would rightly bring the law 
into contempt and it would increase one of the really serious menaces facing 
society today.  This is too great a price to pay for bringing solace to those who 
believe that, come what may, strict logic should always prevail”.  (p.484) 
It is plain that contrary views on the question of intoxication as it affects criminal 
conduct cannot be easily reconciled.  It is equally obvious that such views either for 
or against will continue to be held strongly on both sides. 
S.43AS may be regarded as an uneasy but practical compromise. 
S.43AS may be the best compromise possible, permitting intoxication as a factor of 
basic intent to be considered in pleas of accident or mistaken belief, but not 
otherwise.  These are accepted defences which, if raised on an appropriate 
evidential basis, must be rebutted by the prosecution, but otherwise, and as a matter 
of public policy, the defendant is not permitted to rely on his own self-induced 
behaviour in this respect. 
S.43AS is the result of a vast amount of conference and discussion over many 
years, and, although that does not render it conclusive, it does give pause before 
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suggesting an alternative.  It may also be regarded as a long term benefit if, 
ultimately, it creates a common policy within the “Code” States and Territories. 
We acknowledge that s.43AS is not without its difficulties, but the harsh reality is that 
there is no perfect solution to the question as to how far, if at all, intoxication may be 
a defence to a criminal charge.  This is because, as we have already mentioned, 
there will always be conflicting views based either upon logic or public perception 
where in the two do not always meet.  For instance, the Victorian and  
South Australian approach, as in O’Connor has the virtue of simplicity but has not 
been adopted in other States and Territories presumably because many citizens 
regard it as offensive for a wrongdoer to rely upon one wrongful act to excuse a 
second wrongful act.  The approach in the other States and Territories has been 
Majewski (with variations). 
S.43AS did not receive any serious criticism from such members of the legal 
profession of the NT as this Committee consulted, nor does it appear to have caused 
any particular difficulties so far in the Commonwealth or ACT courts applying it.  We 
acknowledge, however, that an appropriate situation may not yet have occurred.  
The terms of s.43AS do not therefore seem to raise any particular problem so far as 
instruction to a jury is concerned. 
This Committee is particularly influenced by the fact that, to adopt Part 11AA will 
bring the NT in line with two other jurisdictions with the advantage of uniformity, 
which entails including the advantage of judicial decisions from any of the three 
jurisdictions being relevant and important in the development of all. 
Finally, the “Background Paper” already referred to contains the following 
information:  
 The National Criminal Law Reform Committee is currently reviewing the 
Chapter 2 of the Model Criminal Code.  As part of that process, the 
Committee consulted with legal stakeholders around Australia to obtain views 
on problems relating to the operation of Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code.  The 
Committee is currently considering the issues raised by stakeholders and at 
this stage is expected to report on the review in late 2013. 
Any results of this review which need to be translated into amending legislation will, 
no doubt be adopted by the Commonwealth and the ACT and, true to the principle of 
uniformity the NT will no doubt follow. 
The enactment of s.43AS is likewise in conformity with the whole plan of Part IIAA.  
This is the road upon which the NT is advancing, and there seems little to be gained 
by divergence or halting at this stage. 
This Committee is therefore of the opinion that, out of all alternatives, the greater 
advantage and the greater public policy benefit under question 1 is to continue as 
planned.  
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Legislative Policy	
On the question of how the law should deal with intoxication as a circumstance in a 
criminal charge, the debate still ranges (& rages) from allowing intoxication, if 
properly raised, to be always considered in determining whether the accused had the 
appropriate intent (basic or specific); to the other extreme, (reverting back to earlier 
days) that it should never be allowed as a defence to any indictable offence. 8 
The common law approach may seem by some as too favourable to an accused who 
escapes conviction by relying on his own reprehensible conduct.  The alternative of 
denying the defence at all would have its supporters, not only by members of the 
public enraged by what appears to be cases in which a wrongdoer can rely upon his 
own wrongdoing as a defence, but also by distinguished judges, c.f Majewski.  
Obviously public policy requires some form of control against criminal activities in 
which alcohol or drugs figure as part of the scene.  Equally obviously the public 
policy “benefit” lies in the success or otherwise of the control.  However, as noted, 
the law has been ambivalent in how these controls should be imposed.   
So far as this Committee can ascertain, no particular statutory or common law 
process can be regarded as “superior” to any other.     
It therefore becomes a matter of legislative policy to determine which of the various 
statutory or common law provisions should be chosen.  Victoria and South Australia 
have adopted the common law doctrine favoured by O’Connor.  The other states and 
territories have adopted, in various forms, the approach outlined by Majewski. 
Criticisms of s. 43AS 
(a) Background Restated 
S.43AS of the NT Criminal Code is copied, with some minor variations which do not 
affect the substance of the section, from s.8.2 of the Model Criminal Code prepared 
by the Model Criminal Code Officers Committee and published in December 1992. 
Similar sections appear in the Commonwealth Criminal Code s.8 and the ACT 
Criminal Code s.31. 
The Model Criminal Code was prepared by experienced lawyers, after lengthy 
discussion and debate, and after considering written submissions by various persons 
and bodies with the practical and background competence to make such 
submissions.  In addition, it is stated that “lengthy consultation” took place between 
members of the Committee and persons prominent in the law.  (See – Appendix to 
the 1992 Report).   
One must commence, therefore, with the view that the resultant Code is a carefully 
prepared document by competent lawyers drawing on their own experience and on 
the experience of others equally competent.  One may also reasonably assume that 
such difficulties as are presently being mentioned were equally before the 
                                            
8 Hemming – University of Tasmania Law Review – Vol 29 No. 1 2010 
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Committee at the time of preparation of the Model Code and comprehended within 
the final version. 
The “great name” argument does not give the document the form of Holy Writ, but it 
must dictate careful consideration before amendment. 
In a Background Paper to the Legal Profession Forum convened by the Honourable 
the Attorney General of the Northern Territory, it was stated that: 
 “Part IIAA (being based on Chapter 2 of the Model Criminal Code) reflects 
modern standards of criminal responsibility, consistent with other jurisdictions 
in the common law world”. 
This Committee notes also the matters raised for discussion in the paper as to 
possible disadvantages.   
The Background Paper refers to criticisms of Spigelman C.J. as to the general 
concept and language of the Model Code.  His views are sufficiently emphatic to 
demand, in effect, a redrafting so drastic as to produce a new and different Code; or 
to return to common law.  It is not our province to consider such alternatives since 
they do not seem contemplated by those parliaments which have adopted the Model 
Criminal Code.  This Committee must necessarily be pragmatic.  
We proceed on the practical basis that, while there may be some amendments 
required to Part IIAA, it will remain basically in its present form. 
We note that in the recent review of Chapter 2 by the Law Council of Australia  
(23 March 2012), no specific comment was made about the provisions as to 
intoxication and there appears so far to have been no judicial comment in the 
Supreme Court of the ACT about the provisions of s.31 of the ACT Code; although 
we concede that an appropriate case may not yet have occurred. 
We note however that a review of Part IIAA is being conducted; and we note the 
Conclusion to the Report of the Law Council of Australia (2012): 
 “The Law Council considers that the current review of Chapter 2 of the Model 
Criminal Code being conducted by the National Criminal Law Reform 
Committee provides an important opportunity to address a number of 
outstanding and current issues in relation to the implementation of Chapter 2 
of the Model Criminal Code”. 
We deal therefore, with the position as it presently exists, but draw attention to 
certain criticisms presently raised. 
(b) Some Adverse Reasoning 
In a carefully reasoned paper headed “Banishing Evidence of Intoxication in 
Determining Whether a Defendant Acted Voluntarily and Intentionally” 9   
Andrew Hemming, Lecturer in Law at the University of Southern Queensland has 
                                            
9 The University of Tasmania Law Review Vol. 29 No. 1 2010 pp1-28 
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cast doubt on the effectiveness of s.43AS in dealing with the question of intoxication.   
His introductory remarks state: 
 “The analysis is conducted through the relevant intoxication provisions in the 
Criminal Code1995 (Cth) and the Criminal Code 1983 (NT).  The argument is 
made that these two Codes have the weakest and least effective version of 
the Majewski principle of all Australian jurisdictions such that the relevant 
basic intent provisions make the prohibition virtually meaningless.  Revised 
provisions dealing with intoxication have been proposed for s.43AS Criminal 
Code 1983 (NT).  The overriding objective of these redrafted provisions is to 
strengthen the reach of s.43AS, and to make these provisions the strongest 
and most effective version of the Majewski principle in Australia”. 
His contention is that “evidence of intoxication should be inadmissible for all offences 
including murder.  Such an argument is justified on public policy grounds, and by the 
proposition that principles of criminal law relating to voluntariness and intention 
should be secondary to the morally correct position that a person who is voluntarily 
intoxicated is criminally responsible for any conduct he or she causes while in such a 
condition”. 
He does discuss alternatives if his basic proposition is no accepted; but it is clear 
that his primary argument is as set out.  He submits that the distinctions between 
basic and specific intent are confusing and unnecessary, and s. 43AS could be 
simply amended to read: 
 “Evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered in determining 
whether a fault element of specific intent or of basic intent existed”. 
Thus he ranges himself firmly on the side of those who consider it a matter of public 
policy that intoxication should be relegated to the question of sentencing; where the 
court could properly consider whether, in the circumstances, it aggravated or 
ameliorated the offence. 
In a submission to this Committee, Mr Hemming again emphasised his argument: 
 “One of the essential characteristics of a Criminal Code is that the Code 
should be clear.  The relevant section should be clear in its terms.  Judged 
against this criterion s.43AS is a spectacular failure as it contains so many 
qualifications as to be virtually meaningless”. 
He suggests various alternatives including a re-drafting of s.43AS somewhat 
different to that suggested in his original article but “within the nomenclature of the 
Model Criminal Code in Part IIAA”. 
Associate Professor Mark Nolan of the ANU College of Law also draws attention to 
some difficulties of s.43AS.  In a memorandum to the President of this  
NT Committee he states: 
“I try to make the point in the presentations that the Cth Criminal Code (CCC) 
and ACT Criminal Code approach to intoxication shifts the determination of 
basic and specific intent, and therefore the relevance of intoxication evidence 
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under a Majewski approach, from the offence level (as in NSW) to the level of 
the physical element and fault element pair.  Depending on the elements 
analysis done according to CCC elements analysis, principles, there may be 
one or many pairs of different types in the one offence.  If the pairs are of 
different types (ie some basic intent pairs and some specific intent pairs) then 
the intoxication rules that apply within the same offence will be different.  For 
example, common assault, that is typically characterised as a basic intent 
crime, could under the CCC approach have both basic intent and specific 
intent intoxication rules operation.  I also give an example using the CCC 
espionage offence.  That is surely difficult for juries to manage when the ACT 
or the NT are completely codified on the CCC model.  However, there are also 
potential drawbacks with NSW’s implementation of Majewski and its  
offence-level characterisation of basic and specific intent. 
As I mentioned, the act is still partially-codified on the CCC model until  
1 July 2017, However, the codified intoxication rules currently apply to all 
offences in the ACT (relevant for the military discipline jurisdiction too). 
As I said, a case search I did not too long ago did not throw up ACT cases 
where this (un)intended consequence attracted judicial comment.  However, it 
would be good to do such a case search again.”  
This Committee, however, proceeds on the basis, and for the reasons hereinbefore 
set out, that any proposed amendment might cause more difficulties that it purport to 
resolved and that the section should remain as presently drafted; and alternative 
pathways inconsistent with Part IIAA and the goal of uniformity should not be 
considered. 
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THE QUESTIONS OF THE REFERENCE 
The Reference contains a series of “Matters for the Committee to consider” posed in 
the form of questions.  This Committee answers them as follows: 
1. Is there a public policy benefit in holding persons criminally 
“responsibility” (sic – presumably “responsible”) for their actions whilst 
intoxicated irrespective of whether they acted voluntarily or intentionally.  
If so, how is the best way to achieve this policy initiative? 
 ANSWER: A public policy “benefit” is one that benefits the community.  
There seems no doubt that the community considers it a benefit if  
self-induced intoxication, leading to activities against the law, and committed 
with the relevant intent should be subject to criminal sanctions.  If, however, the 
question is raised as to whether the extent of intoxication deprived an accused 
person of the capacity to form the requisite intent, there are conflicting views in 
various jurisdictions, past and present.  They range from the view that it should 
be no defence at all, to the view that at all times, and whether the intent is basic 
or specific, the effect of intoxication on intent should be considered.  
Intermediate views appear in various state and territory jurisdictions.  The 
provisions of Part IIAA of the NT Criminal Code appears at least as effective in 
dealing with the problem as in other jurisdictions, and has the additional 
advantage of uniformity with the Model Criminal Code.  These provisions can in 
the circumstances, be considered “the best way to achieve this policy initiative”.  
Intoxication, not self induced, does not attract criminal responsibility.  S43AV.  
 This does not mean that other approaches, not necessarily involving criminal 
sanctions, should not be explored. 
2. Should this apply only to certain offences, say, to driving offences and 
not to offences of violence? 
 
ANSWER: No.  The provisions of Part IIAA are general and should apply to 
all criminal charges other than those imposing strict or absolute liability.  Note 
that certain driving offences depend on intoxication itself as the prohibited act. 
 
3. Will removing the admissibility of evidence of self-induced intoxication in 
relation to the commission of the offence achieve the purported public 
policy benefit, by limiting the use a tribunal may make of such evidence? 
 ANSWER: Part IIAA does not “remove” the admissibility of evidence of  
self-induced intoxication.  It controls it.  Thus a tribunal of fact in the NT will 
balance the right of the community for protection against offences in which 
intoxication is a consideration with a limited right of the accused to raise 
circumstances whereby he should not be convicted (eg mistake of fact or 
accident).   
 If the question is specifically directed to a situation where the admissibility of 
evidence of self-induced intoxication were entirely removed, the tribunal of fact 
would no doubt find it easier to convict.  But if that meant that occasionally a 
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person with a proper defence would be deprived of that defence it would be 
doubtful if this could be regarded as a public policy benefit. 
4. Should there be a distinction between offences of basic intent and 
specific intent for the purposes of the use of evidence of self-induced 
intoxication? 
 
ANSWER: As previously discussed there is an irreconcilable difference of 
views ranging from O’Connor (no distinction) to Majewski (distinction 
recognised).  It would be unwise – and fruitless – to argue that one view is 
more satisfactory than the other.  But since most Australian states & territory 
jurisdictions and the Model Criminal Code have adopted some versions of 
Majewski, it would be more practical, and in line with the principle of uniformity 
for the NT Code to follow the Model Criminal Code, as it has done in  
Part IIAA.  The argument in Majewski is essentially, that if one accepts that an 
intoxicated person should not be allowed to defend his own criminal conduct by 
relying on his earlier criminal conduct, this can be achieved, at least in part, by 
denying him that defence in basic intent.  One cannot, however, exclude the 
defence in specific intent because a defined offence which uses the expression 
“with intent”, or where a specific intent is embodied in its definition, would 
otherwise be meaningless.  Hence, for instance, the care which the NSW 
legislation takes to set out those offences to which specific intent applies.  The 
answer to the question, for the purposes of the NT Criminal Code is “yes”. 
 
5. If admissibility of evidence of self-induced intoxication is to be limited, for 
which fault elements should this rule apply”? 
 
ANSWER: For the reasons previously given, the fault elements which 
should apply to offences of basic intent are accident and mistaken belief.  
S.43AS(2) & (3). 
 
6. Should the onus of proof of fault elements be reversed when  
self-induced intoxication is sought to be admitted so as to deny criminal 
responsibility”? 
 
ANSWER: It is a serious matter to interfere with the basic concept of 
criminal law that the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, 
and this Committee would certainly not recommend any such reversal here.  
However, it is accepted that the accused must do more than merely say “I was 
intoxicated”.  He must at least raise an “evidential basis” for his allegation, that 
is, he does not have the onus of proving intoxication but he must bring the 
question properly before the court by evidence.  See S.43BU.  Once he has 
done this and the court is satisfied that sufficient evidence exists, the onus 
remains on the prosecution to negate the allegation and do so beyond 
reasonable doubt.  Note S.43BR(1) & (2). 
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7. Should a specific offence of committing a dangerous or criminal act, 
similar to the provisions previously found in the now repealed  
section 154 of the Criminal Code be reintroduced into the  
Northern Territory? 
 
ANSWER: No.  One of the reasons for introducing Part IIAA of the  
NT Criminal Code was the unsatisfactory nature of s.154.  For a detailed 
explanation, see the article by Professor Fairall and Sue Oliver SM referred to 
previously. 
 
8. To what extent should evidence of self induced intoxication be 
disregarded in relation to sexual offences? 
 
ANSWER:   To no extent other than as set out in the Code.  The distinction, 
as in other cases, depends on the distinction between basic or specific intent 
(or physical or fault elements)) insofar as that distinction appears in the 
elements of a particular offence; but subject to the exceptions set out in 
s.43AS(2) & (3). 
  
9. To what extent should evidence of self-induced intoxication be 
disregarded for the purposes of determining the partial defences of 
provocation and/or diminished responsibility? 
 ANSWER: To put this question into perspective, it is appropriate to quote 
the remarks from Gray & Blockland – Criminal Laws NT – 2nd Ed – 2012 at 
p.131. 
 This chapter is concerned with two so-called ‘partial defences’ – 
provocation and diminished responsibility.  Both defences operate in the 
Northern Territory only to reduce murder to manslaughter.  They do not 
apply to any other crimes.  Both defences have been significantly altered 
in recent years.  Diminished responsibility operates only in some 
Australian jurisdictions, and the Model Criminal Code Officers Committee 
(MCCOC) has called for its abolition.  Provocation has been particularly 
controversial in recent years, and has been abolished within the last 
decade in Tasmania, Western Australia and most recently in Victoria.  
Again the MCCOC has called for its abolition.  The Northern Territory 
legislature, however, has clearly decided that there are good reasons in 
the Territory not to heed this call. 
 Provocation and diminished responsibility are called ‘partial defences’ 
therefore, because they reduce but do not completely eliminate an 
accused person’s criminal responsibility for murder.” 
Diminished responsibility was unknown to the common law which, in this area 
of mental competence or otherwise, confined itself to the defence of insanity.  
“Diminished responsibility” was no doubt thought suitable for borderline cases 
not reaching to insanity and was introduced by statute in England in 1957. 
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According to an English authority the object was: 
 “to avoid persons not fully entitled to be acquitted on the ground of 
insanity suffering the capital penalty for murder.  With the abolition of 
capital punishment for murder, the doctrine has lost much of its 
importance”. 10 
 Similarly the provision lost its importance in states and territories where 
capital punishment was abolished and courts were given discretion in 
sentencing for murder, so that diminished responsibility could be reflected in 
the sentence.  It would still be important in the Northern Territory, since the 
sentence remains mandatory as imprisonment for life (s.157); although parole 
is possible after a 20 year period. 11  
 S.159 (3) provides: 
 (3)  If the defendant’s impairment is attributable in part to an underlying 
condition and in part to self-induced intoxication, then, for deciding 
whether a defence of diminished responsibility has been established, 
the impairment must be ignored so far as it was attributable to self-
induced intoxication. 
 However, intoxication must still be considered on any crime of specific intent, 
because a finding of diminished responsibility does not mean acquittal, but 
merely converts the finding to one of manslaughter, not murder.  The jury 
must therefore first determine if a specific intent has been proved because if it 
has not been proved the accused is entitled to a complete acquittal.  Only if 
the jury are satisfied that the offence alleged against the accused has been 
proved, do they then turn to the question of whether the actions of the 
accused may warrant a finding of diminished responsibility (for which the 
accused bears the onus of proof). 
 If the Northern Territory ultimately follows the other States and Territories, and 
allows judicial discretion in sentencing for murder, it will then become 
inevitable to relegate diminished responsibility to its appropriate place as part 
of the sentencing process. 
 Provocation – is a defence now relating only to the crime of murder 12 and 
does not involve an acquittal but only a conversion from a finding of guilty of 
murder to a finding of guilty of manslaughter. 
 Since murder involves a specific intent to kill, the question of intent may 
involve consideration of the effect of intoxication on intent.  Bronitt & McSherry 
– Principles of Criminal Law – 3rd Ed – p.279, comment: 
 “s.31(1) of the Criminal Code ACT and s. 43AS(1) of the Criminal Code 
NT provide that self-induced intoxication may not be taken into account 
                                            
10 Oxford Comparison to Law” 1980 Edition.  See also:  Bronitt & McSherry – 3rd Ed. pp293-4 
11 Sentencing (Crime of Murder) & Parole Reform Act 2003 
12 S.34 of the NT Criminal Code allowed provocation in other circumstances but has now been 
repealed. 
 34 
 
in determining whether “a fault element of basic intent exists” – by 
implication, these provisions allow its consideration for specific intent 
offences”. 
 S.158 of the Code deals with “the partial defence of provocation: 
  158 Trial for murder – partial defence of provocation 
 (1) A person (the defendant) who would, apart from this  
  section, be guilty of murder must not be convicted of  
  murder if the defence of provocation applies. 
 (2) The defence of provocation applies if: 
 (a) the conduct causing death was the result of 
 the defendant’s loss of self-control induced 
 by conduct of the deceased towards or 
 affecting the defendant; and 
 (b) the conduct of the deceased was such as 
 could have induced an ordinary person to 
 have so far lost self-control as to have 
 formed an intent to kill or cause serious 
 harm to the deceased. 
Gray & Blockland comment: -  
 “Provocation must be distinguished from lack of intent”.  It may be 
difficult at times to distinguish between a person who has lost self-
control because of provocation yet still intends to kill, and a person 
who, because of extreme stress partly caused by provocation, kills 
without intent.  The law, however, draws such a distinction.  In the first 
case the accused may be guilty of manslaughter only because of the 
provocation.  In the second case the accused would be not guilty of 
murder under s.156 of the Criminal Code because of lack of the 
necessary intent”. 
 Thus, the lack of self-control must be as the result of the provocation. Gray & 
Blockland point out that “the accused may have lost self-control for some 
reason other than the provocation; for example, because of intoxication”. 
 See also Bonnitt & McSherry – “the loss of self-control must have been 
caused by the provocation rather than another factor such as intoxication”. 
 Thus, by s.158(2)(b) of the Code – “The conduct of the deceased was such as 
could have induced an ordinary person to have so far lost self-control as to 
have formed an intent to kill or cause serious harm to the deceased”. 
 See also s.43AF(5)  - “(5)  Evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be 
considered in determining whether conduct is voluntary”. 
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 The test is the reaction of an “ordinary person” not “an intoxicated ordinary 
person”.  If the conduct of the deceased was provocative within the definition, 
it is irrelevant whether the accused was intoxicated or not.  In other words, the 
accused cannot rely upon intoxication as allowing him to react more than an 
ordinary person would react, but he may allege that, whether he was 
intoxicated or not, the provocation justified his reaction. 13 
 The final comment to this question is that the partial defences of provocation 
or diminished responsibility will remain relevant in jurisdictions which retain 
mandatory life sentences for murder – as in the Northern Territory.  The trend 
– and the more logical one in jurisdictions which allow discretion in sentencing 
is to relegate these “defences” to consideration in sentencing. 
10. Are there other offences where evidence of self-induced intoxication 
should be inadmissible or disregarded by virtue of the charge”? 
 ANSWER: Not to the knowledge of this Committee. 
                                            
13 See Masciantonio v Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58 of 67.  “The test involving the hypothetical ordinary 
person is an objective test”. 
 36 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
It follows, from the matters discussed in this Reference that the Northern Territory 
should continue with the process, already commenced, of equating the NT Criminal 
Code with the Model Criminal Code presently adopted by the Commonwealth and 
the ACT. 
Arguments can be put that other methods of dealing with self-induced intoxication 
have been adopted in other jurisdictions, but, to take a completely objective test, it 
can be said that the approach in the Model Criminal Code as researched over many 
years by many eminent authorities is at least comparable and, some would say, 
more comprehensive than the alternatives.  In any event, the adoption of the Model 
Criminal Code in the Northern Territory provides unanimity of approach in at least 
three jurisdictions.  Furthermore, the High Court, as the ultimate arbiter between all 
jurisdictions, will continue to interpret the various forms of expression used in 
different jurisdictions into a form more acceptable to all. 
As we have mentioned, the difficulty of dealing with self-induced intoxication in 
criminal law is the result of the conflict between two irreconcilable points of view, 
namely:  
(1) Intoxication is an aggravation not an excuse.  He who becomes intoxicated by 
his own volition should not be allowed to use his own reprehensible conduct to 
excuse further reprehensible and criminal conduct; or 
 
(2) A person may become so intoxicated as to lose the capacity to intend or carry 
out the criminal actions he does and, in such a case, must be acquitted. 
The Majewski approach steers a middle course between these two views, and, in 
various forms has been adopted in States and Territories other than Victoria and 
South Australia.  Insofar as it is a compromise, it will satisfy neither of the two 
extreme views at opposite ends of the pole.  But it appears to be an appropriate and 
workable compromise and this Committee sees no reason to suggest alternatives 
which themselves might import more difficulties than they purport to cure. 
The conclusion of this Committee is that the NT should continue the course it is 
presently pursuing of importing the Model Criminal Code into the provisions of the 
NT Criminal Code. 
RECOMMENDATION 
That the Northern Territory continue as soon as practicable to complete the present 
process of adopting the Model Criminal Code into Part IIAA of the NT Criminal Code. 
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APPENDIX 2 
NSW - Crimes Act 1900 
428B   Offences of specific intent to which Part applies 
(1)  An offence of specific intent is an offence of which an intention to cause a specific result is 
an element. 
(2)  Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), the offences referred to in the Table to this 
section are examples of offences of specific intent. 
Table 
(a)  an offence under the following provisions of this Act:  
19A Murder 
27 Acts done to the person with intent to murder 
28 Acts done to property with intent to murder 
29 Certain other attempts to murder 
30 Attempts to murder by other means 
33 Wounding or grievous bodily harm with intent 
33A Discharging firearm etc with intent 
33B Use of weapon to resist arrest etc 
37 Attempts to choke etc (garrotting) 
38 Using chloroform etc to commit an offence 
41 Administering poison etc to injure or to cause distress or pain 
41A Poisoning etc of water supply 
47 Using etc explosive substance or corrosive fluid etc 
48 Placing gunpowder near a building etc 
49 Setting trap etc 
55 Possessing etc gunpowder etc with intent to injure the person 
61K Assault with intent to have sexual intercourse 
82 Administering drugs etc to herself by woman with child 
83 Administering drugs etc to woman with intent 
86 Kidnapping 
87 Child abduction 
99 Demanding property with intent to steal 
110 Breaking, entering and assaulting with intent to murder etc 
111 Entering dwelling-house 
113 Breaking etc into any house etc with intent to commit serious indictable offence 
114 (a) (c) (d) Being armed etc with intent to commit offence 
158 Destruction, falsification of accounts etc by clerk or servant 
172 Trustees fraudulently disposing of property 
174 Directors etc omitting certain entries 
175 Director etc wilfully destroying etc books of company etc 
176 Director or officer publishing fraudulent statements 
178BB Obtaining money etc by false or misleading statements 
179 False pretences etc 
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180 Causing payment etc by false pretences etc 
181 False pretence of title 
184 Fraudulent personation 
185 Inducing persons by fraud to execute instruments 
190 Receiving etc cattle unlawfully killed, or carcass etc 
196 Destroying or damaging property with intent to injure a person 
198 Destroying or damaging property with intention of endangering life 
199 Threatening to destroy or damage property 
200 Possession etc of explosive or other article with intent to destroy or damage 
property 
202 (c) Interfering or damaging etc bed or bank of river with intent of obstructing etc 
navigation 
205 Prejudicing the safe operation of an aircraft or vessel 
210 (b) Acting with intention of destroying etc aids to navigation 
211 Criminal acts relating to railways 
249C Misleading documents or statements used or made by agents 
249D Corrupt inducements for advice 
298 Demanding property on forged instruments 
300 Making or using false instruments 
301 Making or using copies of false instruments 
302 Custody of false instruments etc 
302A Making or possession of implements for making false instruments 
314 False accusations etc 
315 Hindering investigation etc 
317 Tampering etc with evidence 
318 Making or using false official instrument to pervert the course of justice 
319 General offence of perverting the course of justice 
321 (1) Corruption of witnesses and jurors 
322 Threatening or intimidating judges, witnesses, jurors etc 
323 Influencing witnesses and jurors 
328 Perjury with intent to procure conviction or acquittal 
333 (2) Subornation of perjury 
(b)  an offence under the following provisions of this Act to the extent that an element of the 
offence requires a person to intend to cause the specific result necessary for the offence:  
57 (assault on persons preserving wreck) 
58 (assault with intent to commit serious indictable offence on certain officers) 
66B (assaulting with intent to have sexual intercourse with child under 10) 
66D (assaulting with intent to have sexual intercourse with child between 10 and 16) 
78I (assault with intent to have homosexual intercourse with male under 10) 
78L (assault with intent to have homosexual intercourse with male between 10 and 
18) 
78O (assault with intent to have homosexual intercourse with pupil etc) 
91 (taking child with intent to steal) 
94 (assault with intent to rob person) 
95 (assault with intent to rob in circumstances of aggravation) 
96 (assault with intent to rob with wounding) 
97 (assault with intent to rob with arms) 
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98 (assault with intent to rob) 
109 (entering with intent, or stealing etc in dwelling-house and breaking out) 
126 (killing with intent to steal) 
139 (destroys, damages, breaks with intent to steal) 
140 (destroys, damages, breaks with intent to steal) 
197 (dishonestly destroying or damaging property with a view to gain) 
204 (destruction of, or damage to, an aircraft or vessel with intent) 
(c)  any other offence by or under any law (including the common law) prescribed by the 
regulations. 
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